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Abstract
We consider a multi-period auction with a seller who has a single
object for sale, a large population of potential buyers, and a mediator
of the trade. The seller and every buyer have independent private
values of the object. The mediator designs an auction mechanism
which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the
traders. In each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers
drawn at random from the population. The seller can re-auction the
object (inﬁnitely many times) if it is not sold in previous interactions.
We characterize the class of mediator-optimal auction mechanisms.
One of such mechanisms is a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where
the seller pays to the mediator a ﬁxed percentage from the closing price.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper considers the model of Internet-style t r a d ew h i c hc a nb ed e -
scribed as follows. There are a mediator, a large population of buyers, and
a seller who has a single object for sale. We assume that the seller cannot
deal directly with buyers, instead, the trade must be mediated. At the initial
period 0, the mediator establishes a trade procedure (conventionally called
“auction mechanism”) through which she is allowed to collect some part of
the trade surplus.1 The seller observes the auction mechanism and decides
either to consume the object, or to put it for sale. If the object is consumed,
the games ends. If the object is put for sale at period t ≥ 1,as e to fn buyers
is drawn randomly from the buyers’ population and the auction takes place.
There are two important features in our model. First, whenever the seller
fails to sell the object, he is allowed to oﬀer it for auction again, as many
times as he wants. Secondly, in every trade the seller faces a diﬀerent set of
bidders drawn from a large population.
We characterize the class of mediator-optimal mechanisms, where the
mediator commits to a mechanism in advance and is not allowed to change
it during the game. Moreover, we demonstrate how to implement an optimal
mechanism. It turns out that the closing-fee Internet auction is one of such
mechanisms. In the closing-fee Internet auction, the seller (repeatedly) sells
the object via a Vickrey auction. In every auction he selects a reserve price
and, if the object is sold, pays to the mediator a closing fee (a percentage
of the closing price). The fee is selected by the mediator in advance, it is
commonly known and ﬁxed through the entire trade process.
There are important implications of our results. The mediated trade can
1By an auction mechanism we understand a game with incomplete information set
up by the mediator and played by the traders in which a desirable outcome occurs as a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2be viewed as a principal-agent model, where the mediator (the principal) de-
signs an incentive mechanism for the seller (the agent) such that behavior of
the seller maximizes the mediator’s payoﬀ. The standard principal-optimal
solution of the principal-agent model is that the principal collects a ﬁxed
fee from the agent, and after that the agent maximizes his payoﬀ.I ft h e r e
is uncertainty of the agent’s type, then the principal prefers to use a more
sophisticated mechanism which makes the agent to report her type truth-
fully and which discriminates between the agents of diﬀerent types (as in
Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). In contrast, in our model the mediator-
optimal solution is to collect a percentage of the seller’s payoﬀ rather than a
ﬁxed fee, and, even though there is uncertainty of the seller’s type, the only
discrimination in eﬀect is that the sellers are divided into two groups with
respect to their use values: Those who are willing to auction the object and
those who are not.
Surprisingly, the existence of an auction mediator, an independent player
whose inﬂuence on strategic behavior of traders is essential, is not illumi-
nated in the literature. The up-to-date research concentrates on mechanisms
which achieve ex-post eﬃciency or which maximize the seller’s revenue (for
overview see, e.g., Krishna 2002, Chapter 5). In contrast, we focus on the
question of optimal mechanisms for the mediator. This question has a pro-
found relevance to the problem of maximizing proﬁt by giant commercial
trade-mediating institutions which run internet auctions (e.g., eBay, Yahoo,
Amazon).
Our two main assumptions are consistent with the real-life observations.
Indeed, a seller has the re-sale option in real life and this option has essential
impact on players’ strategic behavior, as noted, for example, by Fudenberg at
al. (1985), Milgrom (1987), Gupta and Lebrun (1999), Haile (2000, 2003).
Our second assumption — the seller faces a diﬀerent set of bidders drawn
3from a large population in each period — is also a realistic assumption for
Internet auctions. It is new and crucial for our analysis. In contrast, the
existing literature on auctions with resale assumes that there is the same
set of bidders in all auctions, which implies that the optimal reserve price
declines due to Bayesian updating of the bidders’ private values distribution
after every auction (see Fudenberg at al., 1985; McAfee and Vincent, 1997).
The ﬁrst related work that we are aware of is Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) who analyze a bilateral trade mediated by a “broker”, assuming that
the traders have independent private values for the traded good. In particu-
lar, Myerson and Satterthwaite describe a direct revelation2 mechanism for
the broker which maximizes her payoﬀ subject to individual rationality and
incentive compatibility constraints for the traders. A variety of works ex-
tends Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to the study of two-sided markets
mediated by “platforms”, starting with the double auction of Wilson (1985)
and including (but not limited to) Rochet and Tirole (2003), Hagiu (2004),
Reisinger (2004), and Armstrong (2006). Instead, the focus of this paper is
the mediated interaction of one seller and many buyers. In particular, we
generalize Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983) model in one of our model
extensions (see Section 5.3).
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section
2. In Section 3 we characterize the mediator-optimal mechanisms. Section
4 describes a simple implementation of the optimal mechanism which has
applications for many Internet auctions. In Section 5 we present some ex-
tensions of our model. Section 6 discusses assumptions of the model. Proof
of Theorem 1 is deferred to the Appendix.
2A mechanism is direct if the traders are asked to report their “types”, i.e., their private
values. Further, it is revelation (or truthful) if it is a Nash equilibrium for the traders to
reveal their values truthfully.
42 The Model
We consider a model of repeated auctions where a seller can re-auction the
object in the next period, if the object is not sold in the current period. In
contrast to the standard problem where the seller auctions the object one
and only one time, in our model the seller may decide not to sell the object
at all, or to re-auction it (inﬁnitely) many times, until it is sold. The model
is designed to capture Internet-style auctions.
Let player 0 be the seller and let N be a large homogeneous population
of bidders. The seller has one object for sale. Let v0 ∈ [0,1] be the use
value of the seller and vi be the use value of bidder i ∈ N. Assume that all
use values are independent, furthermore, bidders’ use values are identically
distributed on the interval [0,1] according to the distribution function Fb,
and the seller’s use value is distributed on the same interval according to
the distribution function Fs.L e t fb and fs be the corresponding density
functions. We assume that fb and fs are strictly positive and continuous on
[0,1].
At period t =0 , a mediator chooses a trade mechanism which will be
used thereafter in the game.
At period t =1 ,2,... a random sample of n buyers is selected from
population N. The seller either consumes the object (and the game ends)
or puts it for sale (and the game proceeds to period t+1). At period t+1,
the object is allocated and the payments are transferred according to the
selected mechanism. If the object is sold to one of the buyers, the game ends.
Otherwise, a new random sample of n buyers is selected from population N
and the seller either consumes the object (and the game ends) or puts it for
sale and so on.
We make the following assumptions.
5Assumption 1. In every period a new sample N = {1,...,n} of buyers
is drawn. Every buyer plays only once and has no information about past
plays.
Assumption 2. The buyers are anonymous, that is, a buyer’s strategy
depends on her type (use value), but not on her name.
Assumption 3. There is a discount factor δ, 0 < δ ≤ 1, common for all
players. We assume that if the seller decides to auction the object at period
t, an outcome of the auction is determined in the next period t +1 .T h u s ,
payoﬀs of all players obtained at period t+1are discounted by δ relative to
period t.
Assumption 4. The mediator chooses a mechanism only once at period
t =0 . The mechanism depends only on the current-period reports, i.e., it is
independent of time and the history of play.
Assumption 5. The mediator, the seller and all buyers are risk neutral.
We consider the class of direct mechanisms. In a direct mechanism the
seller and each buyer simultaneously and conﬁdentially report their use
values to the mediator, and the mediator then determines who gets the
object and how much each buyer must pay as some functions of the vec-
tor of reported use values. Formally, a direct mechanism is a pair (p,x)
where3 p :[0,1]n+1 → ∆n+1 describes probabilities of various outcomes and
x :[ 0 ,1]n+1 → Rn+1 d e s c r i b e sp a y m e n t so ft h et r a d e r sa sf u n c t i o n so f
their reported use values. Namely, given the vector of reports at period
t, wt =( wt
0,wt
1,...,wt
n), pi(wt) is the probability that bidder i gets the
object, i =1 ,...,n, p0(wt)=1−
Pn
i=1 pi(wt) is the probability that the
3∆
n+1 denotes the unit simplex in (n +1 ) -dimensional space.
6seller retains the object; xi(wt) is a payment of bidder i =1 ,...,n to the
mediator, and x0(wt) is a payment of the mediator to the seller. Note that
for every i =1 ,...,n, xi is allowed to be non-zero even if buyer i does not
receive the object.
Let ht =( w1,...,wt) be the history of play up to time t. A symmetric
bidding strategy of a bidder, ω :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1], is her bid as a function of









the probability, αt+1, that the seller auctions the object at period t +1
and his bid, qt+1, as a function of history ht and his use value v0.D e n o t e
qt(v0)=q(ht−1,v 0),a n dαt(v0)=α(ht−1,v 0).
A seller’s strategy proﬁle (qt,αt)∞
t=1 is stationary if qt = q1 and αt = α1
for all t =1 ,2,.... Since the mechanism (p,x) does not vary with t,t h e r e
exists a stationary seller’s strategy (q∗,α∗) and a bidders’ strategy ω∗ which
constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Lemma 1 (Revelation Principle) Given a mechanism (p,x) a n das t a -
tionary equilibrium (ω∗,(q∗,α∗)) of the correspondent game, there exists a
direct revelation mechanism (p0,x0) w h i c hh a sap a y o ﬀ-equivalent stationary
equilibrium (ω0,q0,α∗) such that ω0(vi)=vi and q0(v0)=v0.
Proof. For every v ∈ V deﬁne p0(v0,v 1,...,v n): =p(q∗(v0),ω∗(v1),...,
ω∗(vn)) and deﬁne x0(v0,v 1,...,v n): =x(q∗(v0),ω∗(v1),...,ω∗(vn)). End
of proof.
Without loss of generality we assume that (p,x) is a direct revelation
mechanism. Fix (p,x) and consider period t.L e t N = {1,...,n} be the
set of bidders drawn at random from the population N at period t.L e t
vt =( v0,vt
1,...,vt
n) be the vector of use values of the seller and buyers at
4By Assumption 2 we consider only symmetric bidding strategies. By Assumption 1,
a bidding strategy does not depend on the history of play.
7period t (the seller’s use value does not vary with time). Denote by f the
joint density of vt;b yvt
−i and f−i the vector of use values and its joint
densities without i’s coordinate, i =0 ,...,n.L e tV =[ 0 ,1]n+1 be the space
of use value vectors and let V−i be the space value of use vectors without
i’s coordinate.
For every i =0 ,1,...,n denote by ¯ pi(w) the probability of i to obtain





Also, for every i =0 ,1,...,ndenote by ¯ xi(vi) the expected payment of buyer











i) − ¯ xi(vt
i)). (1)
T h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rδ appears here because of our assumption that if an
auction starts at period t, the players are “locked in” until period t +1 ,
when the auction outcome is realized. Thus, payoﬀs of the bidders are
discounted by one period.








That is, at period t the seller gives up the object of value v0 (the ﬁrst term
of the right-hand side of (2)) and at period t +1he obtains the discounted
payoﬀ, the sum of the expected payment ¯ x0(v0) and, if the object is not
sold, the value of the object v0 and the next-period expected gain from the
auction α(v0)Ut+1
0 (v0).












A direct revelation mechanism is feasible if it satisﬁes the following con-
straints:
(a) Individual rationality (IR).F o re a c hp e r i o dt =1 ,2,... and each
buyer i =1 ,...,n,a n de a c hvi ∈ [0,1]
Ut
i(vi) ≥ 0, (4)
and for each v0 ∈ [0,1]
αt(v0)Ut
0(v0) ≥ 0. (5)
The constraint (5) means that the seller expects to obtain a non-negative
gain whenever he assigns a positive probability on auctioning the object,
αt(v0) > 0.
(b) Incentive compatibility (IC). For each trader i =0 ,1,...,n,e a c h





i(wi|vi) is the expected utility of trader i =0 ,1,...,nif she reports
wi when her true use value is vi,t h a ti s ,f o re a c hi =1 ,...,n
Ut









Note that by Assumptions 1 and 4 the next-period expected payoﬀ Ut+1
0 (v0)
does not depend on the current report w0.
93 Mediator-optimal Mechanisms
3.1 Seller’s Decision to Auction the Object
Let CV ∗ be the discounted continuation value of the seller who always auc-
tions the object,
CV ∗ =m a x
w0
δ (¯ x0(w0)+¯ p0(w0)CV ∗). (8)
Note that CV ∗ is independent of v0, because the object is never consumed.
Lemma 2 In a stationary equilibrium, the seller’s decision to auction the






0, if v0 >C V∗,
1, if v0 <C V∗,
(9)
and for each v0 <C V∗ and each t =1 ,2,...
Ut
0(v0)=CV ∗ − v0 > 0. (10)
Proof. By stationarity, Ut
0(v0)=Ut+1
0 (v0) for all t.C l e a r l y ,i fUt
0(v0) >
0,t h e nαt(v0)=1in equilibrium. By (2) and (8), Ut
0(v0) > 0 if and only if
CV ∗ − v0 > 0, thus we obtain (10) and αt(v0)=1if v0 <C V∗. Similarly,
we obtain αt(v0)=0if v0 >C V∗. End of proof.
Note that CV ∗ = v0 is a zero probability event, thus without any eﬀect
on the result we can assume αt(v0)=1for this case.
We thus obtain that if the seller’s use value is higher than the discounted
continuation value from the auction, v0 >C V∗, the game ends in the ﬁrst
period, otherwise the seller auctions the object until it is sold. In the next
subsection we analyze the situation where v0 ≤ CV ∗.
103.2 Analysis of a Stage Game
Fix the seller’s realized use value v0 ≤ CV ∗ and period t.D e n o t eb yU∗
M,t h e

















We now characterize the set of all feasible mechanisms as a function of
U∗





The diﬀerence vi −Cb(vi) is the information rent of bidder i (see discussion
by Krishna 2002, Section 5.2.3). We assume that function Cb (·) is strictly















We have the following result.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the seller’s realized use value v0 satisﬁes v0 ≤
CV ∗.T h e na ta n yp e r i o dt ≥ 1, every feasible mechanism (p,x) satisﬁes
U∗





M + CV ∗), (13)
and
U∗
M + CV ∗ ≤ Q(p,U∗
M + CV ∗). (14)
Proof. See the Appendix.
11Theorem 1 characterizes the mediator-optimal mechanisms for given
CV ∗ and U∗
M.D e n o t e b y Z∗ the joint expected gain of the seller and the
mediator, Z∗ = U∗
M + CV ∗. Clearly, in order to maximize U∗
M for a given

















Q∗(z)= m a x
p0:V→∆n+1 Q(p0,z).












Then we can rewrite z = Q∗(z) as follows,
(1 − δ)z = δT(z). (15)
We have T(0) > 0 and T(1) = 0 (because Cb(·) ≤ 1). Note that function
(1 − δ)z strictly increases and function δT(z) (weakly) decreases on the
interval [0,1]. Hence, there is a unique solution of the equation (15). End
of Proof.
Corollary 1 Let CV ∗ be given and suppose that v0 ≤ CV ∗. A feasible
mechanism (p,x) is mediator-optimal w.r.t. CV ∗ if and only if
(i) Z∗ ≥ 0 is a unique solution of z = Q∗(z),
(ii) p ∈ argmax
p0:V→∆n+1
Q(p0,Z∗),a n d
12(iii) x is selected to make U0(v0)=CV ∗ −v0 and Ut
i(0) = 0 for each buyer















¯ pi(z)dz, i =1 ,...,n.
Proof. Recall that by the IR constraint (4) Ut
i(0) ≥ 0 for all i =1 ,...,n.
By Theorem 1, Z∗ = U∗
M + CV ∗ is maximized if
Pn
i=1 Ut
i(0) = 0 and p
maximizes Q(p,Z∗),w h i c he n t a i l s
Z∗ =m a x
p0:V→∆n+1 Q(p0,Z∗) ≡ Q∗(Z∗). (16)
By Lemma 3, there exists a unique solution of (16), and parts (i) and (ii)
follow. Part (iii) straightforwardly follows from (2), (10), and Lemma 5 in
the Appendix. End of Proof.
Note that by (ii) every mediator-optimal mechanism allocates the object
according to the same rule p which grants the object to the bidder with
the highest use value vi,i fCb(vi) >Z ∗.I f Cb(vi) <Z ∗, the object is not
sold in the current period and the seller will re-auction it in the following
period. Hence, Corollary 1 implies that any mediator-optimal mechanism
is equivalent to the Vickrey auction with the reserve price r∗ = C−1
b (Z∗),
where C−1
b (·) denotes the inverse function of Cb(·).A l s on o t et h a tt h es e l l e r
always receives the same expected return CV ∗ from the auction for any use
value v0 ≤ CV ∗.
3.3 Expected Payoﬀ of the Mediator
In the previous section we described the mediator-optimal mechanism as
a function of the continuation value CV ∗. We shall now select CV ∗ which
13maximize the (unconditional) expected payoﬀ of the mediator, UM,a n dt h e n
derive the desired optimal mechanism (p,x) using Corollary 1.
Since for v0 >C V∗ the seller does not auction the object, and thus the







The mediator’s expected unconditional payoﬀ UM is equal to the product
of the mediator’s expected gain conditional on v0 ≤ CV ∗, U∗
M,a n dt h e
probability that v0 ≤ CV ∗, Fs(CV ∗).W e h a v e U∗
M = Z∗ − CV ∗,w h e r e
Z∗, the highest joint gain of the mediator and the seller, is independent




(Z∗ − CV ∗)Fs(CV ∗). (17)
That is, the expected revenue of the mediator U∗
M conditional on the
event that the auction occurs will balance two opposite forces: The higher
the (conditional) mediator revenue, U∗
M = Z∗ − CV ∗, the lower the proba-
bility that the seller is willing to auction the object, Fs(CV ∗).
From (17) and Corollary 1 we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2 A feasible mechanism (p,x) is mediator-optimal if and only if
(i) The expected joint gain of the mediator (conditional on v0 ≤ CV ∗)a n d
the seller is a unique solution of equation Z∗ = Q∗(Z∗),
(ii) The expected payoﬀ of the mediator is given by
UM =m a x
CV ∗∈[0,1]
(Z∗ − CV ∗)Fs(CV ∗), (18)
(iii) Mechanism (p,x) satisﬁes conditions (ii) — (iii) of Corollary 1 with
respect to CV ∗ as in (18).
144 Implementation
In this section we demonstrate that a mediator-optimal mechanism is im-
plementable by a repeated Vickrey auction with a reserve price, where the
mediator collects her payoﬀ via a simple fee scheme.
Consider the following mechanism, the Closing-fee Internet auction.I n
every period, the mediator runs a Vickrey auction with a reserve price. The
seller submits a reserve price, r, and every bidder submits a bid equal to her
true use value. The winning bidder (if any) pays the greater of the second
highest bid and the reserve price. If the object is sold, the mediator collects





M + CV ∗ ∈ [0,1], (19)
where U∗
M = Z∗ − CV ∗, Z∗ and CV ∗ are deﬁn e di nT h e o r e m2 .
Theorem 3 The Closing-fee Internet auction is optimal for the mediator.




M+CV ∗ of the ex-
pected joint proﬁt of the seller and the mediator Z∗, μZ∗ = μ·(U∗
M + CV ∗)=
U∗




M+CV ∗ implies that the allocation
rule p maximizes Z∗, i.e., p satisﬁes condition (ii) of Corollary 1.
In a Vickrey auction, the optimal reserve price is the solution of the
following equation (see, for example Krishna (2002, Section 5.2.2)),
E (r∗)=x0,
where in our notations E (r∗)=( 1− μ)Cb (r∗),a n dx0 = CV ∗ is the seller’s
expected value. Therefore,











M + CV ∗).
15The object is retained by the seller if r∗ >v i for all i =1 ,...,n,o r ,e q u i v a -
lently, Cb(r∗)=U∗
M + CV ∗ >C b(vi). End of Proof.
Theorem 3 describes the mediator-optimal Internet auction with just one
fee. However, most of the real-life Internet auctions have two fees: A closing
fee, μ,a n dalisting fee, c ∈ R,aﬁxed fee collected at the beginning of every
auction. In Matros and Zapechelnyuk (2006), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider the class of Internet auctions with a pair of fees,
(c,μ). There exists a unique pair of fees (c∗,μ∗) which maximizes the medi-
ator’s expected payoﬀ in this class. The fees are




M + CV ∗ ∈ [0,1].
Theorem 3 and Proposition 1 demonstrate that any mechanism with a
non-zero listing fee is not mediator-optimal. That is, the mediator does
not beneﬁt from asking a positive up-front fee in every auction, or from
subsidizing the seller (i.e., when the listing fee is negative). It is interesting
to note that many Internet auctions charge negligible or zero listing fees,
and, for instance, eBay decreased the listing fee considerably in 2005. See
Matros and Zapechelnyuk (2006) for more examples.
5 Extensions of the model
We discuss several extensions of the model in this section.
5.1 Collusion of the Seller and the Mediator
Suppose that the seller and the mediator collude.5 Then the mediator knows
t h es e l l e r ’ su s ev a l u ea n dm a x i m i z e st h ej o i n tp a y o ﬀ, MS∗. Similar to
5Equivalently, suppose that there is no mediator, and the seller himself is a mechanism
designer.
16Lemma 2, the mediator auctions the object, if v0 ≤ MS∗ and consumes





MS∗ = Q∗(MS∗). (21)
From Lemma 3, we obtain
Z∗ = Q∗(Z∗)=MS∗.
Therefore, the mediator’s continuation value is Z∗.S i n c e Z∗ >C V ∗,t h e
auction occurs with higher probability than in the case of the mediator and
a seller being independent. Hence, the expected joint gain of an independent
seller and the mediator is less than the expected joint gain of them colluding.
5.2 Maintenance Fees
Suppose that the mediator has to pay a ﬁxed maintenance fee η ≥ 0 in
order to run an auction each period. Again, the seller auctions the object,
if v0 ≤ CV η and consumes it, if v0 >C Vη. Then the expected payoﬀ of the













f(v−0)dv−0 − η. (22)
We have the following result.
Theorem 4 Suppose that the seller’s realized use value v0 ≤ CV η.T h e n
at any period t ≥ 1, every feasible mechanism (p,x) satisﬁes
U
η




i(0) + η = Q(p,U
η
M + CV η). (23)
17The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 and omitted here.
The mediator-optimal mechanisms w.r.t CV η,i fv0 ≤ CV η, is similar to
those one described in Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 Let CV η be given and suppose that v0 ≤ CV η.L e t0 ≤ η ≤
Q∗(0). A feasible mechanism (p,x) is mediator-optimal w.r.t. CV η if
(i) Zη ≥ 0 is a unique solution of equation Zη + η = Q∗(Zη),a n d
(ii) p ∈ argmax
p0:V→∆n+1
Q(p0,Zη).
Again, the joint seller-mediator gain Zη is maximized ﬁrst, then this
gain is divided between the seller and the mediator. Following the proof of
Lemma 3, we obtain that Zη is the unique solution of the following equation
(1 − δ)z + η = δT(z). (24)
By assumption, η ≤ δT (0) = Q∗(0). It is straightforward to see that the
total gain in this case, Zη, is a decreasing function of the fee η, because
Zη is a unique intersection of the increasing and decreasing functions in the
equation (24).
Hence, CV η must be a solution of the following optimization problem
max
CV η∈[0,1]
(Zη − CV η)Fs(CV η).
Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5 A feasible mechanism (p,x) with maintenance fee η, 0 ≤ η ≤
Q∗(0), is mediator-optimal if and only if
(i) The expected joint gain of the mediator and the seller is a unique solution
of equation Zη + η = Q∗(Zη),
18(ii) The expected payoﬀ of the mediator is given by
UM =m a x
CV η∈[0,1]
(Zη − CV η)Fs(CV η), (25)
(iii) Mechanism (p,x) satisﬁes conditions (ii) — (iii) of Corollary 2 w.r.t.
CV η as in (25).
5.3 The One-Period Model
Let us consider a special case where the seller is constrained to auction the
object one and only one time. This one-period model is a direct extension
of Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983) bilateral (one seller and one buyer)
trade, mediated by a “broker”, to the n-buyer problem.
Suppose that for any v0 ∈ [0,1] the seller auctions the object in the ﬁrst
period (α1(v0)=1 ) and never re-auctions it (αt(v0)=0for all t =2 ,3,...).
For convenience, in all notations of this section we omit the aﬃxr e f e r r i n g
to period 1. We normalize payoﬀs by selecting δ =1 .
In a direct revelation mechanism, given vi, the expected utility of bidder
i =1 ,...,nis deﬁned by
Ui(vi)=vi¯ pi(vi) − ¯ xi(vi), (26)
the expected gain from trade for the seller is deﬁned by
U0(v0)=−v0 +¯ x0(v0)+v0¯ p0(v0), (27)










Denote by Cb(vi) the virtual value of bidder i, i =1 ,...,n, and denote
by Cs(v0) the virtual value of the seller. Namely, Cb is deﬁned above in (12)





We assume that Cb (·) is strictly increasing (the Myerson’s regularity condi-










The following theorem and corollaries are a straightforward generaliza-
tion of Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983). We omit the proofs.




Ui(0) + U0(1) = W(p), (30)
and
UM ≤ W(p). (31)
In particular, Theorem 6 demonstrates that the expected payoﬀ of the
mediator depends only on the rule of the object allocation, p,a n do nt h e
payoﬀs of players with the extreme private use values. This yields the fol-
lowing result of revenue equivalence.
Corollary 3 (Revenue Equivalence) Let (p,x) and (p0,x0) be two fea-
sible revelation mechanisms. Suppose that p = p0 and the expected payoﬀs
of traders with extreme use values, U0(1) and Ui(0) for all i =1 ,...,n,a r e
the same in both mechanisms. Then the mediator’s expected payoﬀsa r et h e
same in the two mechanisms.
It follows from Theorem 6 that a mediator-optimal mechanism maxi-
mizes W(p),t h a ti s ,t h ea l l o c a t i o nr u l ep grants the object to the trader
with the highest virtual value. Thus, we have the following corollary (see
also Myerson, 1981; and Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983).
20Corollary 4 Every feasible mechanism (p,x) which is optimal for the medi-
ator is equivalent6 to a Vickrey auction with the seller’s reserve price deﬁned




We conclude with a brief discussion of some model assumptions.
1. It is crucial for our results that in every period the seller faces the
same trade environment and, thus, he has the same expected payoﬀ.H o w
the trade environment is modelled is unimportant. Consequently, our results
can be applied to a considerably wider class of problems. For instance, the
number of bidders drawn in every period may be random, as long as it is
identically distributed across periods.
2. The assumption that the mechanism is ﬁxed and stationary is essential
for our results. Real life supports this assumption: in all Internet auctions
the rules and the fees are ﬁxed.
3. In our model a winning bidder is not allowed to re-auction the object.
Adding this possibility for a winning bidder would not make any eﬀect on the
mediator-optimal mechanism, since the winning bidder will face the same
stationary environment in the next period. This contrasts our results to
Zheng (2002), who assumes that a ﬁxed, ﬁnite set of bidders is involved
in trade, thus, the initial seller and a winning bidder face diﬀerent trade
environments.
4. We assume that the auction mediator is a monopolist. It is interesting,
however, to consider the situation with several competing mediators, and
6I.e., the object allocation rule and the expected payoﬀs of the players are the same.
21relate the results to the study of two-sided markets mediated by “platforms”
(e.g, Rochet and Tirole, 2003). We are investigating that now and will report
our results elsewhere.
Appendix
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
We make use of the following two Lemmata (which are modiﬁed results of
Myerson, 1981).
Lemma 4 Let (p,x) be a feasible mechanism. Then, for every i =1 ,...,n,





















i ∈ [0,1]and i =1 ,...,n. Then, using (4) twice (once with the
roles of vt
i and wt













It follows for wt
i = vt
i − ε and arbitrary ε > 0 that
δ¯ pi(vt



















which yields (32). End of Proof.
22Lemma 5 Let (p,x) be a feasible mechanism. Then for every i =1 ,...,n




































































































fb(z) , (34) immediately yields (33). End of Proof.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .


























From (8), since (p,x) is a direct revelation mechanism, we have





























i=1 pi(v),w eo b t a i n
U∗




























which immediately yields (13). Since by the IR constraint Ui(0) ≥ 0 for all
i =1 ,...,n, we obtain (14). End of Proof.
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